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"DRIVING WHILE BLACK": COROLLARY
PHENOMENA AND COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
KATHERYN K. RUSSELL*
INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In the public arena, issues of race continue to command center
stage.' The ongoing debates and discussions have raised new questions,
while not necessarily answering the old ones. Specifically, the recent
dialogues have focused on the role that Blackness plays in today's
society. Some assign Blackness a primary role, others believe it is
secondary. Still others dismiss it as tertiary. These varied positions,
ranging from "race has nothing to do with this" to "race has everything
to do with this" have in some ways canceled out any meaningful
discussion of racial issues. Each of the racial camps has been allowed
to claim victory without giving any ground. The result: racial homeo-
stasis.
This failure of movement is particularly troubling given that in the
legal arena, Blackness itself faces increasing criminal penalty-both
actual and perceived. One of the clearest examples is the phenomenon
of "Driving While Black" ("DWB"). This expression has been used to
describe a wide range of race-based suspicion of Black and Brown
motorists.
2
* Associate Professor, Criminology & Criminal Justice Department, University of Maryland
at College Park. A.B., 1983, University of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1986, Hastings Law School;
Ph.D., 1992, University of Maryland. The author thanks Professors Bernadette W. Hartfield and
Ellen Podgor for the invitation to participate in this symposium.
I One salient example is President Clinton's 1997 initiative on race. See PRESIDENT'S INITIA-
TIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE (1998).
Another is the public debate following publication of RichardJ. Herrnstein and Charles Murray's
book, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
2 DWB has also been used to indicate "Driving While Brown"--the racial profiling of Hispanic
motorists. Blacks and Hispanics, however, are not the only minorities who report being subjected
to traffic stops on the basis of race. See, e.g., LESLIE MARMON SILKO, YELLOW A OMAN AND A BEAUTY
OF THE SPIRIT: ESSAYS ON NATIVE AmERICAN LIFE TODAY 107-23 (1996) (describing the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol's detention and harassment of Native American
motorists).
Racial profiling could be the result of an express police department policy, for example,
where police department memoranda identify a particular racial group as part of its drug courier
profile. It could also be the result of an informal, implied policy in which race is relied upon to
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Once an offense known and discussed almost exclusively among
African-Americans, DWB has risen from relative obscurity. Several fac-
tors are responsible for this. First, the United States Supreme Court
decided Whren v. United States, involving a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to possible racial profiling in routine traffic stops.3 The Whren
Court held that earlier Supreme Court decisions "foreclose any argu-
ment that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on
the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." 4 The Whren
decision thus made clear that, in the Court's eyes, traffic stops moti-
vated by the racial prejudices of individual officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantees, at least when
there are other reasons for the stop.5
Second, during the same time period the Court issued this deci-
sion, there have been several high-profile incidents involving allega-
tions of racial profiling. The case of Robert Wilkins, a Black attorney,
is among the most notable. 6 Wilkins was traveling with family members,
returning home from a funeral. Their car was stopped by a Maryland
State Police officer and detained along a Maryland interstate road. The
officer told the driver (Mr. Wilkins' cousin) he had been speeding and
then requested consent to search the vehicle. After consent was re-
fused, the officers forced the occupants to wait until a narcotics dog
was summoned to sniff the vehicle for drugs. No drugs were found
determine whether stops are made. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing
practices of NewJersey State Troopers). Racial profiling might also be the result of an individual
officer's practices, based on stereotypes and prior experiences.
3116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (1996); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997)
(regarding police conduct during routine traffic stops); Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996)
(same).
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not expressly used the term "Driving While Black," it
has appeared in decisions by lower courts. See, e.g., Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188
(9th Cir. 1996) ("There's a moving violation that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.:
Driving While Black." (quoting Henry L. Gates,Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEw
YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 59)).
4116 S. Ct. at 1774.
5 The Court did note, however, that selective enforcement of the law based upon race could
be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. For detailed discussion and analyses of
the VWhren decision, see AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIANnt L. REv. 425,
432-38 (1997); David A. Harris, Car Wars: TheFourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 556 (1998); Carl J. Schifferle, After khren v. United States: Applying the Equal
Protection Clause to Racially Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law, 2 MicH. L. & POL'v REV. 159
(1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, linority Motorists, and theFuture of theFourthAmendnent,
1997 Sup. CT. REv. 271, 277-79 (1998); Craig M. Glantz, Note, "Could" This Be the End ofFourth
Amendment Protections for Motorists?: Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), 87J. CRINM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 864 (1997); Jennifer A. Larrabee, Note, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and
Equal Protection: The Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6J.L. & POL'y 291 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Melba Newsome, Power: The Usual Suspects, VIBE, Sept. 1998, at 109.
[Vol, 40:717
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and, almost one hour after they had been pulled over, the Wilkins
family was allowed to continue on their journey. Following the inci-
dent, Wilkins filed a federal lawsuit, alleging constitutional and civil
rights violations resulting from racial profiling practices by Maryland
State Troopers2
Another case involved a police shooting along the New Jersey
Turnpike.8 Four young men, three Black and one Hispanic, were trav-
eling south on their way to a basketball camp. NewJersey state troopers
stopped the van due to excessive speed. The police said that as they
approached the vehicle from the rear it moved into reverse. The
troopers responded with several rounds of gunfire, striking the van and
its occupants 11 times.9
Third, in response to the Supreme Court's rollbacks and the
escalating number of well-publicized race-based traffic stops, Congress-
man John Conyers introduced the "Traffic Stops Statistics Act."10 The
1997 bill did not make it through Congress. In April of 1999, however,
Conyers introduced an updated version of the earlier legislation." The
newer version has several additions, including a requirement that po-
lice collect data on gender and record whether the immigration status
of occupants was questioned. The earlier bill was successful in placing
7 The eventual settlement of tie Wilkins case involved monetary damages and injunctive
relief. See Davis, supra note 5, at 440. As Davis relates:
The Maryland State Police consented to adopt a policy prohibiting the use of
race-based drug courier profiles as a law enforcement tool. They further agreed
that the policy would direct all Maryland State Police not to use a race-based profile
as a cause for stopping, detaining or searching motorists traveling on Maryland
roadways.
Id. (citing Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, Civil Action No. MJG-93-468). For an interesting analysis of the
Wilkins case and discussion of related issues, see Davis, supra note 5, at 438-42.
8 SeeJohn Kifner & David M. Herszenhorn, Racial 'Profiling' at Crux ofInquiry Into Shooting
ly Troopers, N.Y. TiNts, May 8, 1998, at B1. For an overview and critique of racial profiling on
the New Jersey Turnpike, see John Lamberth, Driving While Blad; A Statistician Proves that
Prejudice Still Rules the Road, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 16, 1998, at Cl.
9 During the pastyear, the New Jersey Attorney General's office investigated traffic stops made
by 164 New Jersey Troopers. Investigators discovered that some troopers routinely falsified the
race of the drivers they stopped. Further, the investigation revealed the practice of "ghosting."
Some troopers may have used this scheme to hide the fact that they were targeting minority
drivers for traffic stops. "iTwo state police supervisors said it was common practice for troopers
on the turnpike to jot down the license plate number of white motorists who were not stopped
and use them on the reports of blacks who were pulled over." David Kocieniewski, Trenton Charges
2 Troopers with FakingDrivers' Race, N.Y. TiMs, Apr. 20, 1999, at A23.
10 See H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Kevin Merida, Decriminalizing Driving While
Black, 'EMERGE, Dec.-Jan. 1999, at 26 (notingJohn Conyers' introduction of the bill and discussing
the bill's provisions); infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
11 See Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999).
May 19991
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a spotlight on the problem of racially-motivated traffic stops. The
American Civil Liberties Union, for example, initiated a national cam-
paign which highlighted DWB. It ran notices in national publications,
including the New York Times and Emerge magazine.'2 The ad copy read,
"Let me ask you something . . . Should 'Driving While Black' be a
crime?" It also encouraged support for the Conyers bill.' 3
Finally, journalists have given increasing air-time to DWB." As the
number of DWB stories has increased, so has the number of DWB
stories involving Black celebrities. 15 In turn, this media coverage
prompted the call for stepped-up measures to address DWB.
The prevalence of DWB is unknown. Determining its breadth,
however, is particularly important as a sociological phenomenon, given
the role that cars play in American life.'6 This is particularly true for
Blacks who have a historically unique relationship with their cars.
During the era of Jim Crow, separate and unequal laws and racial
discrimination by white business owners meant that Blacks could not
secure hotel accommodations or eat in public restaurants.' 7 This forced
many of those Blacks driving long distances to sleep and eat in their
cars.
The fact that the expression "DWB" has become commonplace is
both heartening and depressing. The DWB short-hand indicates that
1'2 See, e.g., EMERGE, Dec.-Jan. 1998, at 31.
13 The notice also includes the ACLU website, (http://www.aclu.oig/forms/thaffic-
stops.html) and encourages readers to complete a complaint form. See id.
14 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, On Wealthy Island, Being Black Means Being a Police Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1998, at 12; Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to Avoid
Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al; Newsome, supra note 6; Hart Scely, Black Males
Say Its Nonnal forPolice to Find an Excuse to Stop Their Cars and Hunt forDrugs, SYRACUSE HERALD
Am., Oct. 22, 1995, at A12.
15 A short roll call of names of well-known Black men, who have been subject to "DWB,"
include: Marcus Allen, Le Var Burton, Calvin Butts,Johnnie Cochran, Christopher Darden, Miles
Davis, Michael Eric Dyson, AIJoyner, Wynton Marsalis, Joe Morgan, Walter Mosley, Edwin Moses,
Will Smith, Wesley Snipes, Blair Underwood, Cornel West, Jamaal Wilkes, Roger Wilkins and
William Julius Wilson. See, e.g., KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES,
WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTtHER MACROACGRESSIONS 36
(1998).
For many Blacks, including the author, stories of DWB are part of family lore. As a child, I
heard stories about racially-motivated traffic stops. One incident, involving my father's brother
stands out. My uncle, who at the time drove a Lambourghini-a distinctive, rare sports car-was
stopped by police. The officer informed him that there had been a report of a stolen vehicle
fitting his car's description. My uncle asked him the make of the stolen vehicle. The officer,
apparently not sure what type of car my uncle was driving, could not answer
16 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5, at 576 ("[N]o activity is common to more Americans than
driving or riding in a car.").
17 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (196,4); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v, United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
(Vol. ,40:717
HeinOnline  -- 40 B.C. L. Rev. 720 1998-1999
DRIVING WHILE BLACK
this form of racial profiling has entered the public's vocabulary. Can
it be a good sign that a questionable police practice is so firmly en-
trenched that it earns an acronym? The very fact that DWB has become
so widespread that it has an acronym may mean that it has become an
acceptable practice-the acronym makes DWB appear routine, normal
and inevitable.
This Article explores DWB and related phenomena. Further, it
considers how these problems affect criminal justice processing in
particular and social policy in general. The discussion is divided into
three parts. The first part considers ways in which Blackness has be-
come a standard indicator of criminality. The second part provides an
overview of the 1997 Traffic Stops Statistics Act. The final part evaluates
the social fallout of DWB and its collateral consequences.
I. COROLLARY PHENOMENA: DWB's KIN
In recent years, there has been mounting evidence that Blackness
has become an acceptable "risk factor" for criminal behavior.18 In all
facets of life, Blacks report being stigmatized and labeled based on
their race. As several high profile cases make clear, this labeling can
have wide-ranging-even deadly-consequences. These cases point to
the problem of determining what role race plays in interactions with
law enforcement. At the same time, however, these examples indicate
that in some instances the perception that race matters means that race
matters. Further, individual cases can be explained, dismissed and
justified. In their aggregate, the stream of anecdotal cases which sug-
gest that Blackness can be equated with criminality has social conse-
quences. A few examples follow.19
A. Walking While Black
Paul Butler, a Black professor in Washington, D.C., describes his
experience of being stopped, questioned and hassled by police, as he
18For an interesting discussion of the historical and contemporary link between Blackness
and criminality, see Trace)' Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 333-36
(1998). Professor Maclin observes that "[t]oday, police departments across the nation ... con-
tinue to target blacks in a manner reminiscent of the slave patrols of colonial America." Id. at
336; see also CHARSHEE C.L. McINTYRE, CRIMINALIZING A RACE: FREE BLACKs DURING SLAVERY
167-88 (1993).
19 It is noted that while most of the DWB incidents referenced in this Article involve Black
males, Black females also report being subject to race-based traffic stops. See RUSSELL, supra note
15, at 36 (describing Black astronaut Mae Jemison's brush with police); infra note 28 (summa-
rizing Lubbock, Texas incident involving Hampton University basketball coaches, Patricia Bibbs
and Vanetta Kelso).
May 1999]
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returned home by foot one evening.20 Butler details his ongoing "dis-
cussion" with Metropolitan Police officers, who insisted that he show
them identification before being allowed to continue on his way. Butler
stood his ground, and the officers left only after a neighbor identified
him.
B. Idling While Black
In December of 1998, Tyisha Miller, a nineteen-year-old Black
woman, was shot and killed by Riverside, California police after they
responded to a call. 2' Miller's car had a bad tire late one night and she
stayed with the car, parked at a gas station, while her friend got a ride
home and called Miller's family. As her friend left, Miller rolled up the
windows, turned up the car's heat and radio and tipped her seat back.
When Miller's cousin and a friend arrived at the gas station to help,
the cousin found Miller locked in the car, foaming from the mouth
and unresponsive to shouts and banging on the window. A gun was in
Miller's lap.
The friend called 911 to summon police help, reporting they
could not wake Miller and that she had a gun in her lap. When the
police arrived, Miller's cousin told them that Miller was in medical
distress and again mentioned the gun. The police responded by break-
ing Miller's car window and shooting inside. Miller was struck twelve
times in the head and back.
Police initially claimed that Miller shot at them and they simply
returned fire. The four officers involved subsequently backed away
from their initial story, and the police found no evidence that Miller
had fired the gun. One of the more unsettling aspects of the case has
been that, for many Blacks, it underscores the paradoxical threat of
the police. Some even blame Miller's cousin for her death, claiming
"You killed her! You called 911! ''22
20 See Paul Butle, 'Walking Wile Black' Encounters with the Police on My Street, LEGAL TINIES,
Nov. 10, 1997, at 23.
21 See William Booth, Calif. Police Shooting Veiled in Gray, Becomes Black-White Issue, WAsh.
PosT,Jan. 10, 1999, atA3; Don Terry, Unanswered Questions in aFatalPolice Shooting, N.Y. TmiEs,
Jan. 9, 1999, at A8. The U.S. Attorney's office has announced that it will initiate an inquiry into
whether Miller's civil rights were violated. See U.S. to Investigate Killing of Teen-Ager, N.Y. TmIES,
Jan. 5, 1999, at A13.
2 Terry, supra note 21, at A8.
[Vol. 40:717
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C. Standing While Black
This is the name Professor David Cole gives to the "crime" created
by the ordinance at issue in City of Chicago v. Morales.23 The controver-
sial Chicago ordinance makes it a crime for gang members, or anyone
who associates with them, to stand on a public street with no discern-
ible purpose. It empowers police to stop anyone they "reasonabl[y]
believe to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public
place with one or more other persons. '24 The Morales court observed
that the vagueness of such an ordinance does not discourage arbitrary
or discriminatory enforcement.25 The ordinance is eerily reminiscent
of a Georgia slave code statute which stated, "Any person who sees
more than seven men slaves without any white person, in a high road,
may whip each slave twenty lashes. 26
D. Shopping While Black
In a widely-reported 1995 incident, three young Black men, shop-
ping at a suburban Washington, D.C. Eddie Bauer store, reported
being harassed and embarrassed. 27 An off-duty police officer, moon-
lighting as a store security officer, suspected that one of the youths,
Alonzo Jackson, had stolen a shirt from the store. The youth, when
questioned, told store employees that he had purchased the shirt at
that store the previous day. His story was not considered credible and
he was told he would have to remove the shirt he was wearing before he
would be allowed to leave the store. The three youths filed a federal
civil rights lawsuit against Eddie Bauer, alleging "consumer racism."
After finding that the young men had been falsely imprisoned and de-
famed and that Eddie Bauer negligently supervised its security guards,
the jury awarded $1 million in damages. 28
23 See David Cole, 'Standing While Blad,' THE NATION, Jan. 4, 1999, at 24. See generally
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (added June 17, 1992), available in <http://wvv.-
chiicityclerk.com/legislation/codes/cliapter8.4.htunl>; City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53
(Iil. 1997). For a discussion of the ordinance, see Cole, supra.
24 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015. The ordinance carries up to a $500 fine, six
months imprisonment and 120 hours of community service. See id.
25 See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 63.26J. Clay Smith, Jr., Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Langer, 69 NOTRE DAmE L. REv.
1077, 1109 (1994) (quoting Georgia's Act of Dec. 13, 1792).27 See, e.g., Joann Loviglio, Eddie Baier Discrimination Case Goes to Jury in Greenbelt Court,
DAILY REC. (Baltimore), Oct. 8, 1997, at 19.
28 See, e.g., Joann Loviglio, Civil Rights Not Violated, But Eddie Baier Told to Pay $1 Million
in Shoplifting Cast; LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, OCt. 10, 1997, at 4 (Alonzo Jackson was awarded
$850,000 and tie other young men awarded $75,000 apiece).
May 1999]
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E. .. . While Black
There are numerous other miscellaneous offenses which fall un-
der the "While Black" umbrella. One example is "bus riding while
Black." One such incident involved John Gainer, a Black music profes-
sor at the University of Oregon. Based on a grainy enlarged photo of
a different man suspected in a motel robbery, a mall security guard
mistook Gainer for the robbery suspect and called the police. Police
boarded the city bus Gainer was leaving on and asked him to exit the
bus to answer questions. Soon after Gainer left the bus, however, police
discovered the mistake. This was the second time in two years that
police pulled Gainer off a city bus to question him about crimes he
did not commit. The first time, after a series of mail thefts, a bystander
saw Gainer closely scratinizing mailbox numbers and called the police.
Gainer, who is legally blind, told the police he was simply looking for
a house to rent.2 9
The above anecdotes exemplify the extent to which society allows
Blackness to be equated with criminality. Further, it is noted that there
are numerous other ways in which Blackness has been targeted and
criminalized, such as legislation enacted explicitly to address what is
perceived as Black deviance.30 Although some might argue that race-
There have been other court cases which have alleged consumer racism. See, e.g., Steven A.
Holmes, Large Damage Award to Black IWom Store Suspected of Theft, N.Y. TINiES, Dec. 11, 1997,
at A17 (citing case finding Dillard's department store engaged in systematic discrimination
against Black customers, with federal jury awarding plaintiff Paula Hampton $1.56 million).
Anecdotal incidents of racial discrimination while shopping abound. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WIL-
LIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-47 (1991).
In a recent case, two Black Hampton University basketball coaches were stopped and de-
tained by police, in Lubbock, Texas. The coaches, in town for a game against Texas Tech, were
arrested and charged with running a confidence game. It was later determined that the two had
been mistakenly suspected. See Mark Asher, Hampton Coach Decies Being "Falsely Accused, 'VAsn.
POST, Nov. 19, 1998, at El.
2 See Black Professor Alistaken for Robbery Suspect-Again, Associated Press, Dcc. 29, 1998; cf.
How about some common sense?, THE BULLETIN (Bend, OL),Jan. 6, 1999, at A6 (editorial recount-
ing these repeated mistaken police apprehensions of Gainer but arguing racism was not involved).
For more examples of how Blackness has been used as indicia of criminality, see DAVID COLE,
No EQUALJUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE ANIERICAN CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 16-62 (1999).
30 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND TIlE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 150-201 (1997). Roberts offers an incisive critique of how laws have been
used to criminalize Black reproduction. The federal crack statute, which punishes possession of
crack one hundred times more severely than powder cocaine, is another example of a law enacted
partly due to racial fears. The bill was passed partly in response to the wide-spread fear that
inner-city crack and its problems would spread to the suburbs. For a detailed discussion of the
historical relationship between race and federal drug laws, see United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp.
768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 34 E3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 40:717
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based police practices simply reflect crime rates, this view raises as
many questions as it answers.31
A review of American history indicates that equating Blackness
with criminality has long been a profitable enterprise. Professor Fred-
erick Dennis Greene provides an interesting analysis of the parallels
between the economics of the U.S. slave trade and today's prison
system, as evidenced by the explosion in incarceration and prison
construction 32 In this mushrooming incarceration, Blacks are six times
more likely than whites to be held in jail or prison.33 This incarceration
suggests that DWB and other "While Black" offenses are part of a much
larger social problem.3 4
Mountains of anecdotes from the rich, famous and otherwise,
have not resulted in a tangible, productive response to the problem of
DWB. In order to move the debate beyond anecdote and personal
narrative, it is clear that something more is needed. Enactment of the
Traffic Stops Statistics Act has the potential to further transform the
debate from an individual, micro-level issue, to a societal, macro-level
concern. The next section details and critiques this legislative response
to DWB.
31 The argument is that Blacks are more likely to arouse police suspicion because Blacks are
more likely to commit street crime. It is true that Blacks are disproportionately more likely to
engage in street crime. Their rates of criminal involvement, however, do not approximate their
encounters with the police. While Blacks are responsible for approximately one-third of all street
crime, studies indicate that nearly half report having been watched or stopped by the police when
they have done nothing wrong. See, e.g., Sandra Lee Browning et al., Race and Getting Hassled by
the Police, 17 POLICE STUD. 1, 3, 6 (1994) (finding that about 47% of Blacks and 10% of whites
surveyed report being "personally hassled" by police; 66% of Blacks and 12.5% of whites report
"vicarious hassling" by police (knowing someone who has been hassled by police)).
32 See Frederick Dennis Greene, Immigrants in Chains: Afrophobia in American Legal History-
The Harlem Debates Part 3, 76 OR. L. REv. 537, 562-65 (1997). Notably, increases in incarceration
and prison construction are occurring despite the fact that since 1980 the total crime rate has
generally decreased. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAISTics-1997, at 261 tbl.3.111,
285 tbl.3.120 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1998).
3 See Fox Butterfield, Number of Inmates Reaches Record 1.8 Million, N.Y. TimS, Mar. 15,
1999, at A12 (Blacks six times more likely than whites to be held in jail and now make up over
40% of inmate population).
34 Professor Derrick Bell has argued that racial progress for Blacks is more likely to take place
if the relief serves "the best interests of the country." DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW 12 (3d ed. 1992). In other words, such progress is more likely if the relief benefits more
than just Black people.
May 1999]
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II. RAY OF LIGHT?: THE TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS ACT35
For almost two years, the proposed Traffic Stops Statistics Act ("the
Act"), offered a beacon of hope for altering the racial landscape of
routine traffic stops.36 The 1997 Act and its updated version would
require record-keeping for each traffic stop. An officer who pulled over
a motorist would have had to record an array of data for each traffic
stop, including the race and age of the person stopped, whether a
search was conducted and whether it produced contraband, whether
a citation or ticket was issued and the legal basis for the stop.37
Not surprisingly, the proposed legislation and its state-level coun-
terparts38 have sparked a good bit of controversy and support. Police
unions, for instance, have raised two main objections. First, such a law
would place an undue burden on an already overworked police force.
Second, such legislation would reverse years of police training de-
signed to discourage officers from "seeing" race. The International
35 H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-435 (1998), available in 1998
WL 105467 (discussing a later version of the bill). The version of the bill that passed the House
in 1998 was known as the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1998.
s6Draft notes following the original Conyers bill state:
No American should have to live with the constant fear of an unwarranted pullover
African-Americans across the country are familiar with the offense of "DWB,"
driving while Black. There are virtually no African-American males--including
Congressmen, actors, athletes and office workers-who have not been stopped at
one time or another for an alleged traffic violation, then harassed with questions
and searches. They may not receive tickets, but they do receive humiliation and
more reason to distrust the justice system.
(notes on file with author).
37 See H.R. 118.
38 Several states and jurisdictions have taken up this issue. For example, in California, A.B.
1264, a bill introduced by State Representative Kevin Murray, wotld have required annual
record-keeping through die year 2003. See California Traffic Stops Statistics Act, A.B. 1264,
1997-98 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1997); see also Doc Anthony Anderson, III, They're guilly of driving
while being black or brown, SAN DIEco UNIoN-TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 1998, at B7 (discussing origins
of the bill). In contrast to the federal bill, A.B. 1264 explicitly mandated recording the genderof
the person stopped. See generally S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, CoMMITTEE REP. FOR 1997 CAL.
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1264, 1997-98 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1998), available in Westlaw CCA Database
(discussing features of California bill). In 1998, then-Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the bill. See
Anderson, supra.
In April of 1999, the North Carolina legislature gave final approval to a bill which would
mandate data collection for routine traffic stops. See The State Requires Study of Highway Patrol
Stops; N.C. House approves 'driving while black' bilA MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Apr. 8,
1999, at 3B. Rhode Island has similar legislation pending. SeeTraffic Stops Statistics Act of 1998,
S. 98-2434, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998). In addition, in at least two cities, San Jose and San Diego,
California, law enforcement officials are voluntarily keeping race-based statistics on traffic stops.
Julie N. Lynem & Marshall Wilson, When Police Stop People for 'Driving While Blach' Cities move
to track who is getting pulled over, SAN FRANclsco CHRONICLE, Apr. 7, 1999, at Al.
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Association of Chiefs of Police, the largest organization of police ex-
ecutives, opposes any such legislation.3 9 The National Organization of
Black Law Enforcement Executives, however, has voiced support for
the Conyers legislation.40
Aside from objections raised by law enforcement, the bill's word-
ing was problematic and its approach too narrow. First, it did not
require any data about the police officer (e.g., age, race). Second, it
would not have provided information on the location of traffic stops
(e.g., city, state). As a result, the data could not be used to discern
possible trends in DWB stops. Furthermore, the collected data were
only to be used for research or data collection; the data would not be
available for litigation purposes.
The failure to pass either federal or state legislation-or adopt
other measures in their place-that would provide a picture of the role
of race and traffic stops, leaves us where we started. The law's failure
to respond proactively to the documented problem of DWB has several
consequences. For one, the absence of a way to measure the breadth
and scope of the practice forces reliance on anecdotes and lawsuits. As
a result, a great deal of what has been learned about racial profiling
in traffic stops has been filtered through civil actions, such as Robert
Wilkins' case.41
The settlement in Wilkins revealed the degree to which Maryland
State Troopers target Black motorists. 42 The terms of the settlement
mandated the maintenance of computer records for all motorist stops.
Along the Interstate 95 corridor, Black motorists, who comprise about
seventeen percent of motorists, comprised more than seventy percent of
the people stopped by the Maryland State Troopers between 1995 and
1997.43 Amazingly, the racial imbalance in traffic stops persisted even
after Troopers were notified that their stops were being monitored.44
The singling out of minority motorists represents an egregious,
identifiable harm. There are, however, other, subtler outcomes which
may sprout from these practices. The next section considers the possi-
ble fallout from society's failure to rein in DWB and DWB-related
incidents.
39 See Kevin Johnson & Gary Fields, Police chiefs resist race-related tallies, USA TODAY, Apr. 8,
1999, at 7A.
4o See id.
41 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
42 See supra note 7; see also RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 40-43; Lamberth, supra note 8.
43 See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 41-42.
44 This result raises the issue of what the impact of a bill such as the Traffic Stops Statistics
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III. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO ACT
This Article has argued that DWB is part of a larger phenomenon
which increasingly criminalizes Blackness. There are several potential
outcomes from our continued failure to respond to the increased
equating of Blackness with criminality. Two recent examples follow.
A. Legal Circumvention
In United States v. Leviner,45 Federal District Judge Nancy Gertner
issued a downward departure in the federal sentencing guidelines.46
The reasoning behind the downward departure makes this otherwise
unremarkable case remarkable. Alexander Leviner had several prior
convictions before the subject of the case-being a felon in possession
of a handgun. Under the guidelines, Leviner's criminal history clas-
sified him as a "Category V" offender, the second highest category."7
After reviewing the record, Judge Gertner made two observations.
First, that Leviner was Black. Second, she pointed out that most of his
prior convictions were for motor vehicle offenses. 48 These factors led
Judge Gertner to conclude that Leviner's priors were likely a result of
DWB stops:
Motor vehicle offenses in particular, raise deep concerns
about racial disparity. Studies from a number of scholars, and
articles in the popular literature have focused on the fact that
African American motorists are stopped and prosecuted for
traffic stops, more than any other citizens. And if that is so,
then it is not unreasonable to believe that African Americans
would also be imprisoned at a higher rate for these offenses,
as well. 49
It is unclear whether other judges have taken action similar to
Gertner. It is known, however, that in other contexts federal judges
Act would be. If the Wilkins case is any guide, the institution of a Coiyers-like bill would do little
to deter racial profiling, at least in the short-term.
45 Criminal No. 97-10260-NG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20323 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 1998).
46 This decision has been widely reported. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Bias Cited in Reducing
Sentence of Black Alan, N.Y. TIMiEs, Dec. 17, 1998, at A22; David Cole, 'Driving While Black: Curbing
race-based traffic stops, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at A25.
47 SeeLeviner, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20323, at *25. Category VI is the highest criminal history
category under the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. Scores 10-12 are in category V. See id. at *25
n.17. Leviner's total score was 11. See id. at *25.
48 See id. at *26-28.
49 Id. at *33-34 (citations omitted). Judge Gertner sentenced Leviner to a 30-month term.
See id. at *38.
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have sought relief from harsh, racially disparate laws. The response
of some federal judges to the federal crack statute provides one such
example. Indeed, more than a few federal judges have balked at the
disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences and at their
racially disparate impact.50 Some judges have resigned in protest 1
while others have apologized to defendants in advance of sentenc-
ing.52
B. Public Policy Fallout
A recent case involving the National Urban League illustrates
another negative consequence of failing to address the DWB issue. In
the fall of 1998, the Urban League withdrew from the Clinton Admini-
stration's "Buckle Up America" campaign. 53 The drive, which would
make failure to wear a safety belt a primary traffic offense, would allow
police officers to stop and ticket motorists for neglecting to do so.
Citing concerns and fears that such a practice would result in increased
racial profiling of Blacks, the Urban League withdrew its support.
The Urban League's response, though understandable, is prob-
lematic. This is especially true given that young Black and Hispanic
motorists are twice as likely as their white counterparts to die in crashes
due to failure to wear seat belts. 54 Furthermore, the failure to address
the problem of seat belt use in Black and Hispanic communities in-
creases the probability of not only higher mortality rates, but also
increased auto insurance premiums and hospital costs for crash-related
injuries. The Urban League's response indicates that the problem of
DWB extends beyond the criminal justice system and impacts support
for social policies. This stance has the potential for creating as much
harm as it seeks to prevent. The Urban League's position symbolizes
the tension between Blacks and the law enforcement community.
0 See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 133 & 188 n.6.
51 See id.
52 See, e.g., Judge Is Forced to Lengthen Sentences for Crack, N.Y. T"NIES, Nov. 27, 1995, at B5
("[Judge Lyle Strom] who has bucked Federal sentencing guidelines in crack cocaine cases,
arguing that they discriminate against blacks, reluctantly obeyed a higher court's instructions last
week and used those guidelines to sentence two brothers. But in issuing the sentence [lie] ...
apologized and told the brothers lie would continue working to soften the guidelines.").
5 See Warren Brown, Urban League Quits Seat Belt Drive; Group Cites Fears of Increased Police
Harassment of Minorities, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1998, at A14.
5 See id.
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C. Other Responses
In addition to legal circumvention and public policy fallout, the
DWB problem undoubtedly has additional ramifications. Moreover,
the overarching issue of equating Blackness with deviance has a wide
range of social costs. These include racial hoaxes,55 anti-Black conspira-
cies,-56 lack of trust between police and Black and Hispanic communi-
ties and a more general racial alienation.5 7
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a brief overview of various ways that Black-
ness has been criminalized and associated with deviance. The discus-
sion has primarily centered on DWB, and the host of legal, social and
empirical questions raised by this recent phenomenon. It is argued
that although DWB is among the most well-known crimes of Blackness,
it is hardly the only one of its kind. In fact, the net which criminalizes
Blackness has been cast far and wide.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the societal consequences of
failing to address DWB and related phenomena, are grave indeed. The
association of crime and deviance triggers a predictable cycle of events.
First, it increases the probability that Blacks will be targeted for arrest.
This in turn increases the probability that Blacks will be convicted and
incarcerated for crimes.58 Following logically, the enhanced likelihood
of a felony conviction increases the likelihood of disenfranchisement."8
55 See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 69-93.
- See, e.g., id. at 145-46; Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: Anti-Black
Conspiracy Theorizing & the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1021 (1995). See generally
PATRICIA A. TURNER, I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE: RUMOR IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
CULTURE (1993).
57 See, e.g., Vincene Verdun, The Only Lonely Remedy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 793, 794 (1998) ("1
put all [the racial slights] in [my] gunnysack, then and every time since then, until the sack got
full. I threw all the hurt that comes from being black into the gunnysack, and then I moved on.
But now, the gunnysack is full and heavy, and I sometimes get really tired of carrying it around....
You see, once the sack is full, any new weight that is picked up must be put somewhere else, so
it is stored in the heart, the mind, the kidneys, or somewhere." (emphasis added)); see also RUSSELL,
supra note 15, at 138-48.
58 Increasing incarceration of Blacks seems likely despite the fact that crime is on the decline.
See generally Fox Butterfield, Inmates Serving More Time, Justice Department Reports, N.Y. TiimS,
Jan. 11, 1999, at A10 (quoting observation of Frank Zimring, director of the Earl Warren Legal
Institute at University of California at Berkeley, that "the changes in the American prison popu-
lation are the result of a shift in policy, rather than any basic change in the nature of criminals
or the crime rate"); Butterfield, supra note 33 (number of inmates at record high though crnie
rates have dropped for seven consecutive years; Blacks six times more likely than whites to be
held in jail).
59 See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE
IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998). This report
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Further, a felony conviction increases social marginality in many tan-
gible ways, such as circumscribing employment possibilities (thereby
increasing the probability of re-offending).
The impact of this goes far beyond those particular African Ameri-
cans who have directly experienced racial targeting. As discussed
above, it affects Blacks as a group and alters their response to the
criminal justice system. As important, however, is the fact that crimi-
nalizing Blackness taints the image that every other racial group-
whites, American Indians, Asians and Hispanics-have of Blacks. These
images, which have historically materialized into racially-skewed crimi-
nal justice policy, regenerate the cycle.
indicates that 13% of Black men (1.4 million) are disenfranchised due to criminal conviction for
certain types of crimes. See id. at 1. Black men represent more than one-third (36%) of all persons
ineligible to vote due to a felony conviction. See id.
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